This paper develops a synthesis of three basic societal dimensions. These three qualify as basic dimensions by virtue of being collectively inclusive, mutually exclusive to a higher degree than any alternative dimensions we have explored, and universally applicable, i.e., to all social situations. We take the six transact dimensions to be such a set. Of these six we here develop a synthesis of three (acts, people, and time) which we take to be most basic, not in the sense of relative (...) importance to human life and welfare, but in the sense of being completely mutually exclusive, of being explicitly as well as implicitly necessary in the modelling of a very large proportion of social situations, and of being not at all elusive when observed as here in all-or-none units for the acts, “noses counted” for the people, and discrete units of time. For these reasons we consider this set of dimensions especially suitable for first attempts at synthesized rational and predictive models (as distinct from purely analytical, empirical and descriptive models). It is anticipated, however, that as initial efforts increase our scientific skill, essentially the same modelbuilding techniques will be applicable when the “trickiest” or most compounded of the transact dimensions, namely values and circumstances, are also dealt with. Other systems of synthesized, predictive models which we are exploring are described briefly in a later note. (shrink)

Enhanced by over one thousand pictures and fifty maps, tells the story of Chicago and how it grew from a frontier outpost to become one of the great cities of the world.

Mele questions the prevalence and ontological status of strong forms of self-deception, as well as our attempt at experimental demonstration. Without validated indicators outside laboratory contexts, statements about prevalence are purely speculative. Conceptualizing self-deception without positing the motivated lack of awareness of a contradictory belief is unsatisfactory in dealing with issues of “agency,” that is, how can we stop the processing of threatening information unless we recognize that the information is threatening?

Book reviewed in this article: Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research. By Edward Diener and Rick Crandall The Ethics of Social Intervention. Gordon Bermant, Herbert C. Kelman, Donald P. Warwick.

The World Anti-Doping Code (2021) includes a substance on the prohibited list if it meets at least two of the following: (1) it has the potential to enhance or enhances sport performance; (2) it represents an actual or potential health risk to the athlete; (3) it violates the spirit of sport. This paper uses a case study to illustrate points of tension between this code and enhancements that are appropriate to ban; we argue that there are banned drugs (e.g., acetazolamide (...) and dexamethasone) the use of which we have good reason to not only permit but encourage for high-altitude sports. Drawing on lessons from this case study, we propose a reformulation of the Code that requires (1–3) be met but offers preferable ways of unpacking conditions (1) and (3) – and in a way that better preserves how the spirit of sport condition should be indexed to particular sports. Our formulation is inclusive enough to rule in drugs like acetazolamide and dexamethasone as permissible in high-altitude sports while at the same time ruling out problem cases – including many drugs already on the prohibited list. The result is an attempted alignment between the conditions specified and those drugs that should be banned. (shrink)

Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) asked individuals to make predictions about the duration or extent of everyday events (e.g., cake baking times), and reported that predictions were optimal, employing Bayesian inference based on veridical prior distributions. Although the predictions conformed strikingly to statistics of the world, they reflect averages over many individuals. On the conjecture that the accuracy of the group response is chiefly a consequence of aggregating across individuals, we constructed simple, heuristic approximations to the Bayesian model premised on the (...) hypothesis that individuals have access merely to a sample of k instances drawn from the relevant distribution. The accuracy of the group response reported by Griffiths and Tenenbaum could be accounted for by supposing that individuals each utilize only two instances. Moreover, the variability of the group data is more consistent with this small‐sample hypothesis than with the hypothesis that people utilize veridical or nearly veridical representations of the underlying prior distributions. Our analyses lead to a qualitatively different view of how individuals reason from past experience than the view espoused by Griffiths and Tenenbaum. (shrink)

Toward A Sociological Imagination builds on the ideas C. Wright Mills expressed in The Sociological Imagination for an approach to the scientific method broad enough to open up to the full range of knowledge within the sociology discipline. In this book, nine sociologists and one philosopher provide detailed tests of the utility of the approach within diverse substantive sociological areas.